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SYMPOSIUM ON THE PLA,CE OF FAMILIES 
, ." r' • 
Response to Essays in PEGS SymposiulD on The Place ofFamilies:
 
Family Life, the Politics of the Family, and Social Transformation
 
Linda C. McClain 
Why do families matter? Why is the premise that strong 
families are a foundation of a strong polity a staple in politi­
cal rhetoric, even as the politics of the family remain divisive? 
I address these questions from the vantage point of political 
theory and law in The Place of Families,' Fostering Capacity, 
Equality, and Responsibility, My book offers a framework for 
thinking about the relationship between family life and political 
life and often contested issues of family law and policy I appre­
ciate the forum this journal is providing for an exchange about 
my book with political theorists and political scientists and thank 
the contributors for their commentaries, 
Canvassing the various commentaries 
mon themes and diverse reactions, My 
highlight interconnections and then 
respond to some specific points of 
each contributor- First, the normative 
vision that I advance about the place 
of families is rooted in core liberal and 
feminist principles, Professors Nancy 
Hirschmann, Jyl Josephson, and Mary 
Lyndon Shanley are in basic agreement 
with this normative vision, By contrast, 
Manuel Lopez questions whether my 
normative vision is either possible or 
reveals both com­
responseJ' wi II first 
policies, reasonable feminist critiques simply cannot hope to 
prevail against arguments rooted in ideology Shanley suggests 
that what is needed is nothing short of a radical (and unlikely) 
transformation from the ideology of consumerism and capital­
ism to a more socialist perspective that better recognizes human 
interdependency Finally, Lopez contends that my formative, or 
transformative project, of promoting sex equality flies in the face 
of constraints dictated by our human nature, and particularly, our 
sexual natures as women and men, 
The Place of Rights 
My book, as Shanley observes, answers the question, "why 
Ifone accepts, as r do, a principle 
Qfsome public responsibility to meet 
human needs, including the needs of 
childl-en. then we do not re(v only on 
families to meet such needs. Assessing 
whether or notfamities are/ailing 
requires a bmader examination Qf 
failures ofpublic re5pol1sibility. 
good, Second, I identify providing care and fostering civic virtue 
as two of the basic functions that families serve in what I call 
a formative project of fostering democratic and personal self­
government Shanley and Josephson concur with this formative 
role, while Hirschmann offers skepticism about whether fami­
lies produce social-rather than personal-values and whether, 
as they actually function, families are seedbeds of civic virtue 
rather than of civic vices, 
Third, the need for and obstacles to social transformation is 
a theme common to the diverse responses, All four contributors 
identify certain obstacles to achieving the sort of family law and 
policy I champion, although they locate these constraints rather 
differently Hirschmann suggests that, like other feminists, I 
direct my attention toward-and am overly sanguine about-the 
power of the state to bring about fundamental reform, while a 
better strategy would ~e for women to pressure men to change 
their behavior- Josephson cautions that while my arguments 
carefully and rationally critique conservative arguments and 
do families matter?" by emphasizing 
the formative role of families in pro­
ducing citizens capable of democratic 
and personal self-government and how 
that formative role justifies society's 
support of families, She comments, 
however, that a rights orientation would 
be another way to frame the issue that 
is consonant with my approach, but 
different in emphasis, Why not speak 
about the rights of children to the pre­
conditions for stable family relationships and the rights of adults 
to form and maintain family relationships and the preconditions 
for sustaining these various rights? Children, as Shanley points 
out, have needs, vulnerabilities, and interests, For many adults, 
procreating and parenting are vital parts of a conception of a 
good life, 
I agree that rights have a place, A focus on what children need 
and deserve-and how this translates into claims to rights-is a 
useful way to consider the practical as well as political signifi­
cance of families. My notion of a formative project builds this 
into "fostering capacity." Just as I focus on capacity, Shanley 
(drawing on Peggy Cooper Davis's work on the legacy of slavery 
for current family policy!) stresses the capacity to form a family 
and governmental responsibility to help people form and main­
tain parent-child relationships. Of course, it bears noting that a 
rights orientation does not, in and of itself, quell controversies 
over family law and policy. Disagreements over what kind of 
family children need, over how to define parenthood, and over 
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who should have access to assisted reproductive technology are 
easily framed in the language of children's rights. 
Shanley's commentary suggests a possible reading of my book 
that I would reject: that families matter only because of their role 
in social reproduction. This might suggest that families warrant 
attention only because they serve the state by producing respon­
sible future citizens. Families also matter to the persons who 
make up families: there are many personal goods associated with 
family. My book notes the personal and political dimension of 
the family both as individual experience and social institution. 
Finally, Shanley stresses the constraints of the "neo-liberal 
political culture of our day," capitalism and consumerism, and 
identifies the need for a radical transformation. To wit, she 
doubts that the vision of families that I elaborate is possible 
without the emergence in the U.S. of a more explicitly socialist 
perspective and general recognition of human interdependence. 
Feminists (including myself) often find instructive models in 
the more generous family policies of European social welfare 
states. At the same time, some incremental progress is possible 
and worth seeking. 
The Trouble With Men 
Shanley and Hirschmann both question whether my affinna­
tive vision of societai recognition and support for care as a public 
value has any chance of implementation, under current social 
conditions. Hirschmann's critique pushes in a strikingly different 
direction. She questions whether the proper feminist response is 
to seek governmental action, rather than for wives and mothers 
to insist that husbands and fathers change their behavior. What, 
realistically, can the state offer to take the place of inadequate 
spousal help? Women, she contends, need to insist on change. 
Moreover, they may have the power to do so. She makes the 
intriguing observation that men's "inessentiality" to the family 
becomes more apparent as government takes on certain sup­
port roles and facilitates women's economic citizenship through 
policies like anti-discrimination laws. Hirschmann suggests that 
women should use their leverage to get the point across that if 
men wish to keep their membership in families, they need to 
"start pulling their weight." 
Hirschmann's contention that perhaps what feminists identify 
as a policy problem is really a problem of power dynamics and 
persuasion has some merit. That men make excuses for not doing 
their fair share as fathers and husbands, and that women can moti­
vate men to change is a basic premise of "how to" books sllch as 
Joshua Coleman's The Lazy Husband: How To Get Men to Do 
More Parenting and Housework 2 So too, Hirschmann raises a 
pair of useful questions: how are men to be persuaded to change, 
and how are women to be persuaded to insist on that change? 
I share with Hirschmann an interest in egalitarian marriage. 
The Place of Families argues that equality within marriage has 
an important relationship to marriage quality (endorsements for 
Coleman's book seem to agree). Public policy, as Hirschmann 
notes, has made egalitarian marriage more possible by fostering 
women's greater economic independence and, hence, greater 
wiJlingness to exercise an exit option from marriage. My book 
identified concrete reforms in family law and developments in 
constitutional law that have facilitated women's equal citizenship 
and repudiated the common law model of marriage as a gender 
hierarchy in favor of marriage as an equal partnership. Laws 
drafted in gender-neutral terms, like the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA), aim to facilitate mothers and fathers (or 
female and male care givers) assuming care taking responsibili­
ties without sacrificing employment. That men take leave far less 
than women signals that the FMLA has been a necessary but not 
sufficient step to address this work/life issue. I believe that public 
policy has an ongoing role to play in structuring institutions in 
ways that encourage gender equality, but Hirschmann usefully 
reminds us that the state may not be an effective or appropriate 
catalyst to bring about certain forms of behavioral change. 
Seedbeds of Civic Virtue or Vice? Or, the Private 
Pleasures of Parenthood 
Hirschmann advances another line of cntlque. My book 
stresses the formative role of families in fostering responsible 
citizenship, but do families really deserve all the glowing rheto­
•ric about being seedbeds of civic virtue? Do we really think par­
ents are serving the state, rather than themselves, when they rear 
children? The pleasures (and pains) that parents derive from their 
children cannot, Hirschmann observes, be translated into social 
values. Moreover, families may simply be "seedbeds" of selfish 
rationalization! Do families really deserve all the privileges that 
the state provides them? 
This skepticism about the formative role offamilies is a famil­
iar argument raised by some feminist legal theorists (e.g., Mary 
Anne Case, whom Hirschmann cites) about whether the social 
reproduction argument really holds water. One argument rejects 
the idea that society really.depends on procreation and parent­
hood at all: the U.S., on this view, could produce plenty of future 
workers simply tJu·ough more liberalized immigration policies. 
Hirschmann's argument takes a different form: there is no guaran­
tee that families will produce virtuous citizens rather than intoler­
ant ones, and therefore, it is not clear that parents are producing 
something that benefits their fellow, nonparent citizens. 
Appeals to social reproduction, Hirschmann suggests, invite 
a quality control or accountability argument: if families deserve 
support because of what they do for the state, then what may the 
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state do to ensure that they are actually producing responsible 
future citizens? One might formulate this in a communitarian 
way: if society entrusts parents with certain rights and concrete 
entitlements, then what may it reasonably expect in terms of 
responsibilities and social contribution? 
The notion of investing in human capital certainly resonates 
with my idea of fostering capacity. If one is looking at the care 
taking role of families, then one could assess outcomes by look­
ing at how children are faring, in terms of basic indicators like 
nutrition, education, health, and the like. Meeting the basic needs 
of children should be done, whether or not it directly fosters their 
good citizenship. But if one accepts, as I do, a principle of some 
public responsibility to meet human needs, including the needs 
of children, then we do not rely only on families to meet such 
needs. Assessing whether or not families are failing requires a 
broader examination of failures of public responsibility. 
If one looks at the civic dimension, one could look at attitudes 
children are developing. But even so, if the values that children 
are internalizing are ones that could be regarded as inimical to 
democratic values, then parental success does no.t mean suc­
cess in producing democratic virtues. This is a puzzle my book 
addresses. Our constitutional scheme harbors a liberal expec­
tancy that the values inculcated in families and other institutions 
of civil society will be congruent with democratic values, but it 
also recognizes that they may not be. 3 The recognition of a fun­
damental parental right-and responsibility-to direct children's 
lives rests on a premise that the state does not have a right to 
standardize its children.4 
In liberal theory, some argue that the freedom to form, pursue, 
and act on a conception of the good life without governmental 
coercion includes the freedom to be a couch potato and to choose 
not to develop fully one's capacities5 Liberals recognize a right 
to make incorrect or unwise choices. One rationale is a Millian 
noninterference point: so long as my being a lay-about is not 
harming others, this must be regarded as part of a zone of indi­
vidualliberty.6 
But when the issue is parental direction of the lives of chil­
dren, immediately we seem to move out of the simple Millian 
boxes of self-regarding and other-regarding actions (as Mill him­
self insisted). If nothing else, children are affected by the deci­
sions and direction of their parents; society is, as well. Our fed­
eral constitutional scheme holds that parents have a fundamental 
liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children, 
on the premise that they will naturally pursue the best interests 
of their children. Rhetoric about the domain of family as one 
that the state may not enter suggests a shield against state intru­
sion. However, as The Place ofFamilies pointed out, the family 
is not immune from governmental regulation. Government itself 
has authority to foster the healthy development of children and 
70 The Good Society 
to regulate to pursue their best interests. One answer that my 
book offers to Hirschmann's concern about parents producing 
less-than-virtuous children is that the state properly plays a 
compensatory/complementary role in shaping children through 
measures such as education and through promoting important 
constitutional and public values. It is consistent with commit­
ments of liberalism and feminism to fostering capacity, equality, 
and responsibility to identify an educative role for the state in 
informing persons intending to become parents about the needs 
of children and the responsibilities of parents. Indeed, I would 
support education of adolescents in relationship skills, family 
life, conflict resolution, and the like. Whether the state is the best 
provider of such education, or whether it should enlist the insti­
tutions of civil society to do so, is a fair question. The turn, in 
recent years, to public-private partnerships to carry out various 
formative projects illustrates this recognition of the importance 
of civil society. 
Finally, in arguing that family members get things from each 
other that are not directly passed on to the state, such as laughter, 
love, vacations, and the like, Hirschmann questions the rationale 
for state compensation of parents when childless fellow-citizens 
will not get these positive psychic benefits. She asks if I am 
arguing that every adult should have and raise children, that 
families must by definition contain children, and that only fami­
lies count as the locus of citizenship. If so, she worries that my 
focus on the family may end up "displacing the individuals who 
make up the civil society." As she surmises, this sort of move is 
not consistent with a commitment to liberal diversity and I do not 
make it. The Place ofFamilies, like some other liberal feminist 
work on the family, is corrective: it invites greater attention to 
the significance of the formative role offamilies in creating the 
individuals spoken of within liberal theory. Other institutions 
of civil society also playa role in shaping individuals and that 
fOl'mative process is one I have begun to address in other work. 
Membership in families is not the only associational good that a 
good society would foster. The Place ofFamilies did not attempt 
to offer a general account of civil society, or of how to situate 
families within civil society, but that was not because I believed 
those forms of associational life were not important, either for 
their personal or public dimensions. 
Marriage Partisanship, Marriage Promotion, and the 
Limits of Liberalism 
I thank Josephson for her careful engagement with my book 
and for locating it in the tradition of Susan Moller Okin's work, 
Justice, Gendel; and the Family,? I am honored by her charac­
terization of my book as a "more deeply elaborated and nuanced 
update" of Okin's argument. Josephson wonders, however, just 
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how far a liberal analysis can get when the topic is the family, 
since "it is in our intimate lives with others that we are least like 
the independent, autonomous selves of liberal ontology." She 
seems to accept that liberal ontology, in the sense of a commit­
ment to rights, is a necessary condition for human dignity and 
self-determination, but not a sufficient one. I agree with her. 
Moreover, while she views my book as primarily addressing a 
non feminist audience, such as social conservatives and persons 
in the marriage movement, it also aims to persuade feminists that 
liberalism is not an empty tool box when it comes to analyzing 
family. By advancing a relational model of autonomy, draw­
ing on feminist work on the situated self, I seek to address the 
feminist critique of liberalism as atomistic. And in crafting an 
account of toleration and permissible regulation of the family 
that accepts core feminist points about the public significance 
of the problems of an unjust division of labor and of domination 
and abuse in the family, I seek to address the feminist critique 
that liberal rights are an illusion. 
Concerns over problems of inequality, domination, and vio­
lence are one reason that Josephson worries that I am too much 
of a marriage partisan and too ready to embrace a governmental 
role in promoting marriage. No doubt, I could have devoted 
more time in my book to explicating the many feminist critiques 
of marriage promotion and of social conservative thought, more 
generally. In a sense, the book takes as a given that, for better 
or worse, relationship education and governmental promotion 
of marriage are part of the current policy landscape. It argues 
about how core constitutional and political commitments to 
equality and concerns for fostering equality within and among 
families should inform those policies. It criticizes the marriage 
movement as well as federal programs linking welfare reform 
to promoting "healthy marriage" and "responsible fatherhood," 
both because they ignore the broader spectrum of obstacles that 
low-income parents face and because they are, at best, ambiva­
lent about gender equality. 
movement's goal is to teach gender appropriate-traditional-roles 
in marriage. But at least some prominent voices in the marriage 
movement do advocate gender equality, in terms of equal rights and 
responsibilities of spouses and parents. 
I have considerable sympathy with Josephson's concerns 
over whether marriage promotion could be combined with 
protecting low-income women, men, and children from abuse 
and violence within families. No doubt, the consistent lobby­
ing by feminists and advocates for poor women has made sure 
that marriage promotion law addresses domestic violence. 
Josephson is lightly concerned over whether it does so ade­
quately. But I would note several points. First, the Department 
of Health and Human Services has built into the definition of 
"healthy marriage" the premise that domestic violence is not 
part of such marriage.8 Second, the legislation requires that 
marriage promotion programs indicate how they will address 
domestic violence. Third, one hopes that policy makers will 
heed the findings of researchers (commissioned by the federal 
government) that domestic violence is an obstacle to stable 
family life for some low income, unmarried parents and that 
marriage promotion is not appropriate in such contexts. Fourth, 
relationship education, to the extent it aims to train people 
about nonviolent means of conflict resolution, might exert 
some positive influence on changing attitudes and behaviors 
that spill into violence. 
Economic inequality is another obstacle to marriage. I con­
cur with Josephson that we should pay greater attention to how 
economic inequality shapes access to family life. The U.S. is 
experien~ing a "marriage gap," whereby marriage seems out of 
reach to low income and working class citizens and more readily 
available to the affluent because of the perception that healthy 
marriage requires certain economic preconditions. If so, then 
this is a matter of social justice that warrants attention. 
Finally, Josephson raises a question posed by some other 
reviewers of my book: why should 
That said, Josephson and I differ on marriage, even the updated, more egal­f support, on liberal and feminist 
whether marriage is properly govern­ itarian form I support, be maintained?grounds, the proposition flwt gov­
ment's business. I support, on liberal Why not try different approaches toernment has a proper role to play
and feminist grounds, the proposition governmental regulation and supportin educating citizens with re,"pect to 
that government has a proper role to of intimate affiliation? In part, my
fami~y fije, marriage, and relation­
play in educating citizens with respect answer is pragmatic: marriage carries
ships more generally. And 1 beLieve 
to family life, marriage, and relation­ a symbolic and practical weight as a
that government has a proper role in 
ships more generally. And I believe way of organizing intimate life. The
.!c)stering the preconditions for per­
that government has a proper role in litigation over access by same-sex 
sons to form and sustain family liJe.
fostering the preconditions for persons couples to marriage (which I support) 
to form and sustain family life. has brought to the fore the myriad 
Josephson also regards as naive my idea that government practical benefits and protections tied to marriage. My book 
could provide relationship education to poor women in a way that also proposes developing a registration system that would 
promotes gender equality, since, on her analysis, the marriage offer forma) support and recognition for intimate relation-
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ships other than marriage, including ones not involving 
sexual intimacy. 
Does Fostering Sex Equality Defy Human Nature 
and Corrupt Love and Marriage? 
Lopez argues that much of the beauty of the world up to now 
has been tied up with recognizi~g and promoting sex difference 
and inequality, unjust as this may be, and that the sort oftransfor­
mative project I propose threatens to corrupt "our most private 
and precious goods, romantic love and the family." It is hard 
to respond to this thesis when we seem to see the world so dif­
ferently. I would situate Lopez's critique within the context of 
arguments that the feminist project, generally, is a form of social 
engineering that does not adequately reckon with the constraints 
of human nature. Specifically, he asks whether my project of 
fostering sex equality is either possible or good. r would turn 
the same questions back to him and ask whether accepting and 
institutionalizing sex inequality is possible or good. 
First, the appeal to human nanlre. Lopez accut:ptely reports 
that my book expresses "skepticism about appeals to 'nature' 
or to 'sex differences" as a justification" for policies because 
of the historic role of such distinctions in restricting women's 
citizenship. I note the emergence of sex equality as a constitu­
tional norm and contemporary public value. Lopez seems criti­
cal of this development, suggesting we should want to know 
"whether the law is sound or just, and whether this norm really 
is good." Fair enough. I take it that his project would be to 
determine what constraints our sexual natures place upon social 
arrangements. And then perhaps he would offer an account of 
how much of the .current constitutional commitment to equal 
protection and, in family law, to equal rights and responsibili­
ties of spouses and parents would be rejected as contrary to our 
natures. 
Sex inequality, as a social system that allocates privileges 
differently to men and women, may have inspired some great 
works of literature, as Lopez suggests, and r yield to none in 
being a fan of Jane Austen. However, to interpret this injustice 
as a kjnd of beauty must surely depend upon the vantage point 
of the assessor. The fact that Elizabeth Bennett, witty heroine of 
Pride and Prejudice, triumphed in the marriage market by get­
ting an adoring and wealthy Mr. Darcy (properly humbled by her 
good influence) does not lessen the injustice of the social system 
that entailed the family estate away from any female heirs and 
in favor of the unctuous Mr. Collins. The quiet desperation of 
the widow and daughters in Sense and SenSibility, who have to 
leave their family home in favor of the male heir, hardly seems a 
thing of beauty. That the sisters manage to marry and at least one 
marries financially well may show how females could triumph 
72 The Good Society 
within the confines of the social system, but surely those sisters 
might have looked with envy to Emma, "handsome, clever, and 
rich, with a comfortable home and happy disposition," who could 
declare that she had "none of the usual inducements of women to 
marry.,,9 That she does marry for love, not economic necessity, 
and that she appears to have a relative equality with her husband 
who, to accommodate her father's attachment to her, will move 
into her house, instead of the reverse, does not lessen the beauty 
or grace of the story. 
Lopez voices concern that love of equality can corrupt and 
degrade romantic love and the family. Feminist reformers, rather 
than seeing beauty in inequality, saw the corruption of domi­
nation, the despotism that John Stuart and Harriet Taylor Mill 
condemned. The reforms of family law over the last century 
have targeted forms of inequality that flowed from the common 
law model of marriage. Where Lopez might see beauty, reform­
ers saw hierarchy and tyranny in a legal model of marriage that 
legally suspended wives' civil existence and gave husbands legal 
authority to physically chastise wives, control their movements, 
manage and dispose of their property, demand their household 
services and earnings, and be exempt from the law of rape. 
Courts and legislatures rationalized the husband's authority over 
the wife and their separate spheres by reference to their different 
natures and different destinies. 
The contradiction between revolutionary principles of 
equality and liberty and the common law model of marriage 
was evident from the founding. As my book recounts, the evo­
lution of the model of companionate marriage stemmed in part 
from a premise that marriage should be based on a model of 
mutuality rather than hierarchy. As separate spheres ideology 
yielded to the family law reforms of the late 20th century, an 
ideal of marriage as an equal partnership emerged. Gender­
based classifications came to be seen as rooted in outdated 
or archaic stereotypes and the U.S. Supreme Court stressed 
that the "pedestal" onto which women were placed by these 
various restrictions was more of a cage. Is Lopez arguing 
that dismantling this legally sanctioned hierarchy has been a 
wrong-headed project? There was nothing "natura]" about this 
hierarchy: it was legally and socially constructed. If Lopez 
is questioning the soundness of this jurisprudence, how far 
does his critique reach? How will studying human nature tell 
us whether it is proper to have laws allocating to husbands 
the right to choose the family's domicil~ or to manage family 
property or whether such laws should yield to a model of equal 
rights and responsibilities? 
No doubt, the appeal to sex difference as an explanation, if 
not justification, for many social practices continues. Lopez does 
not discuss the recent interest in brain science and in differences 
between male and female brains, but it offers a good illustra­
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tion of the challenge of drawing normative implications from 
sex difference. Recent sex scandals involving male politicians 
have sparked discussion about reasons for marital infidelity and 
pointed to the brain chemistry of "alpha males." But even if these 
claims had some foundation, would they justify or excuse such 
conduct? 
Finally, to clarify what my project is and is not: Lopez links 
my argument that sex equality is a core value to general "trans­
formative political projects to establish sexual equality in defi ­
ance of nature," including a host of social changes tied to the 
1960s and 1970s. Merely because my theory draws on liberal 
political theory does not 1in1< it to this host of s.ocial phenomena 
associated with a liberalizing of social attitudes about sexuality. 
Rejecting conservative sexual ideology that assigns women the 
role of sexual gatekeepers does not mean I simply champion 
. male "modesty" by analogy to the female modesty championed 
by proponents of reviving courtship. My point is that it is wrong 
to assign women a special responsibility to control male sexual­
ity, just as it is wrong simply to assume that men have little to no 
control over their sexual conduct. Whatever men's nature, it is 
appropriate for society to inculcate norms of respect for bodily 
integrity and to encourage men and women to deal with each 
other with mutual respect. The fact that, from an evolutionary 
perspective, male sexual jealousy may be an adaptive behavior, 
which, when taken too far, spills over into lethal violence against 
women hardly means that society may not attempt to prevent and 
punish such violence. 
Even some of the most ardent marriage promoters argue that 
the advent of pair bonding and the institution of marriage are 
momentous steps in human development, rather than simply 
a natural state.lO As such, they are fragile achievements, and 
require constant tending and shoring up by the forces of civil 
society and law. An appeal merely to human nature, including 
sexual nature, simply will not do the work that Lopez suggests it 
can when it comes to marriage. 
Conclusion: On Persuasion and the Place for
 
Marriage in (New) Life Scripts?
 
I will conclude with two brief points: one on persuasion and 
the second on life scripts. It may be, as Josephson argues, that 
efforts at reasoned argument fail to persuade when addressing 
convictions rooted in ideology. Nonetheless, a premise of The 
Place of Families is that it is possible to take the shared intu­
ition that families matter and attempt to find some common 
ground on political values. This is not easy work, but i 
worth attempting. 
Second, it is undeniable that life scripts about marriage: 
family are in transition. On the one hand, marriage retain 
special significance in law and culture for its symbolic mean 
and tangible consequences. On the other, people are departinl 
many ways from the conventional script of love, marriage, • 
baby carriage. I I As William Galston recently observed, for m, 
young people today, getting married and having a child-by 
contrast to getting an education and securing employment-do 
not signify achieving adult status in the way they did for 
young people in earlier generations. 12 As the place of marriage 
changes, society will face new challenges concerning family life, 
the politics of the family, and family policy. 
Linda C. McClain is the Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar and 
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she teaches family law and feminist theoly. Her most recent 
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Responsibility (Harvard University Press, 2006) She is cur­
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